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L3 MAX Public-max · non-destructive

Public surface assessment — Tieturi

WordPress training site. Live XML-RPC methods, SSH:22 on web IP, weak headers, partial DMARC. True L3: HIGH 4 · MEDIUM 5.

Target tieturi.fi Date 2026-07-29 RoE public-max · non-destructive Engagement eng_tieturi_l3_1358

HIGH

MEDIUM

INFO

—

Executive summary

Why act now

These findings are not theoretical: they are public surfaces a human or a hacker agent can consume today. Each card has proof links, impact, owner, fix, and validation — so the team takes risk seriously and acts.

Each finding includes: problem, where (clickable link), attacker/agent impact, owner, PoC (read-only), how to fix, and how to validate.

WordPress training site. Live XML-RPC methods, SSH:22 on web IP, weak headers, partial DMARC. True L3: HIGH 4 · MEDIUM 5.

Stack in this run

Component	Used	Note
ParviClaw Core + AWP	YES (lab)	full pack on engagement
ParviSight browser	partial	HTTP walk / agentic
PayBotFin Witness live	as engaged	honest scope in annex

Findings

Each finding includes: problem, where (clickable link), attacker/agent impact, owner, PoC (read-only), how to fix, and how to validate.

TI-H1

XML-RPC fully enabled

HIGH

The problem

https://tieturi.fi/ — POST system.listMethods returns large method set (system.multicall, wp., metaWeblog., pingback., WPML translationproxy., …). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

XML-RPC enables amplified brute force and pingback abuse.

Where

https://tieturi.fi/ · https://tieturi.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public xmlrpc surface on tieturi.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Tieturi — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sS -X POST https://tieturi.fi/xmlrpc.php -H 'Content-Type: text/xml' --data '<?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>system.listMethods</methodName></methodCall>' | head -c 500

How to fix

Disable XML-RPC if unused; WAF rate-limit; block system.multicall from internet.

How to validate the fix

Disable XML-RPC if unused; WAF rate-limit; block system.multicall from internet.

TI-H2

SSH TCP/22 open on web IP

HIGH

The problem

What / evidence: Live connect to port 22 open on https://tieturi.fi / www. Fix: Bastion/VPN only; key-only last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

SSH on public web IP is a permanent brute-force target.

Where

tieturi.fi · TCP/22

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: SSH on public IP is a permanent brute-force target.
Agent (LLM+tools): Port-scan brand IPs; spray against TCP/22.
If invasive/destructive: Shell on host. L3 only proves port open.

Who owns it

Tieturi — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

nc -zv -w 3 tieturi.fi 22

How to fix

Close TCP/22 on public edge or restrict by allowlist/bastion; keys-only; fail2ban; no password auth.

How to validate the fix

Close TCP/22 on public edge or restrict by allowlist/bastion; keys-only; fail2ban; no password auth.

TI-H3

Dangerous HTTP methods (deep matrix)

HIGH

The problem

https://tieturi.fi/ — What / evidence: Deep: TRACE/PUT/DELETE/PATCH returned 200 HTML — re-baseline methods on edge. Fix: Force 405 for TRACE/write verbs last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on tieturi.fi expands recon until closed.

Where

https://tieturi.fi/ · https://tieturi.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on tieturi.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Tieturi — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://tieturi.fi/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on tieturi.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on tieturi.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

TI-H4

Public wp-login + weak headers

HIGH

The problem

https://tieturi.fi/wp-login.php — What / evidence: wp-login public; CSP/XFO/nosniff missing (only HSTS class). Fix: MFA/WAF + full headers last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Default WP login is a permanent spray target.

Where

https://tieturi.fi/wp-login.php · https://tieturi.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public wp_login surface on tieturi.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Tieturi — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://tieturi.fi/wp-login.php'

How to fix

MFA, rate limit, WAF, optional allowlist; combine with blocking user REST enum.

How to validate the fix

MFA, rate limit, WAF, optional allowlist; combine with blocking user REST enum.

TI-M1

DMARC quarantine pct=25

MEDIUM

The problem

DNS TXT at _dmarc.tieturi.fi publishes a DMARC policy with p=none (monitor-only). Receiving servers do not quarantine/reject forged @tieturi.fi mail on DMARC fail. This is email brand spoofing / BEC risk, not a website bug. Proof: dig TXT _dmarc.tieturi.fi +short last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Brand email spoofing / BEC remains easier while DMARC on tieturi.fi is not reject.

Where

DNS record (not a website): _dmarc.tieturi.fi TXT
Mail domain: @tieturi.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Forge invoices / IT resets as @tieturi.fi while p=none.
Agent (LLM+tools): Re-check DMARC; automate brand-domain spoof campaigns.
If invasive/destructive: Financial fraud via trusted-looking mail — not CMS takeover from this alone. L3 only proves DNS policy (dig).

Who owns it

Tieturi — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

dig TXT _dmarc.tieturi.fi +short

How to fix

Align SPF/DKIM for all legitimate senders; move DMARC to p=quarantine then p=reject; monitor rua; document third-party senders.

How to validate the fix

Align SPF/DKIM for all legitimate senders; move DMARC to p=quarantine then p=reject; monitor rua; document third-party senders.

TI-M2

Fat SPF ~all

MEDIUM

The problem

multi-vendor softfail (surface: https://tieturi.fi/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Weak SPF increases spoof windows for the brand domain.

Where

https://tieturi.fi/ · https://tieturi.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public spf surface on tieturi.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Tieturi — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://tieturi.fi/'

How to fix

Tighten SPF includes for tieturi.fi; avoid overly broad ~all without DMARC reject.

How to validate the fix

Tighten SPF includes for tieturi.fi; avoid overly broad ~all without DMARC reject.

TI-M3

No CAA / security.txt

MEDIUM

The problem

No CAA / security.txt (surface: https://tieturi.fi/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on tieturi.fi expands recon until closed.

Where

https://tieturi.fi/ · https://tieturi.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on tieturi.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Tieturi — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://tieturi.fi/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on tieturi.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on tieturi.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

TI-M4

Related hosts

MEDIUM

The problem

events Eventilla, uutiskirje, true.tieturi.fi live (surface: https://tieturi.fi/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on tieturi.fi expands recon until closed.

Where

https://tieturi.fi/ · https://true.tieturi.fi · https://tieturi.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on tieturi.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Tieturi — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://tieturi.fi/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on tieturi.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on tieturi.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

TI-M5

Session cookie flags incomplete

MEDIUM

The problem

Session cookie flags incomplete (surface: https://tieturi.fi/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on tieturi.fi expands recon until closed.

Where

https://tieturi.fi/ · https://tieturi.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on tieturi.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Tieturi — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://tieturi.fi/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on tieturi.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on tieturi.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

Evidence annexes (AWP + Core)

Real pack from L3 max retest 2026-07-31 (public-max, non-destructive). Each file has a caption. Links open the artifact.

1) awp-receipt.json — AWP crypto

What it is: signed Agent Witness Protocol receipt (offline-verifiable).
What it proves: integrity of our test/engagement log.
What it is NOT: not alone proof of the bug on your host (that is each finding’s PoC).
→ download awp-receipt.json

2) leaves.jsonl — engagement diary

What it is: append-only leaves (scope, probes seal, catalog, quality, seal).
What it proves: timeline of this retest run.
→ download leaves.jsonl · leaf-chain.txt (PASS)

3) retest-raw.json — HTTP probes

What it is: status/headers/samples from public-max probes.
What it proves: what the internet saw during the run.
→ download retest-raw.json

4) agentic-walk.json — surface map

What it is: multi-page walk summary (URLs, sizes, forms).
→ download agentic-walk.json · core-export.json

5) folder

→ open full evidence folder · engagement eng_tieturi_l3_retest_1361 · witness_mode local_awp_dev (DEV_LAB keys — not production ceremony).

How to use / verify AWP (open-source)

Client steps

Download awp-receipt.json from the annex (or clone the evidence folder).
On any machine with Node 18+:

# from the evidence folder
npx agent-witness-protocol verify awp-receipt.json

# or with local package
node /path/to/agent-witness-protocol/bin/awp.js verify awp-receipt.json

Honest PASS meaning: the receipt’s signature, Merkle inclusion, and checkpoint check out — the test log is intact.
PASS does NOT mean: your production bug is fixed, or that PayBotFin live network witness was used (this pack is local_awp_dev / DEV_LAB unless noted).

PayBotFin Witness: live network emit is optional and engagement-scoped. If not listed above as network_emit, do not claim live PayBot verification for this run.

Remediation order for the team

Close HIGH public exposures first (auth / VPN / DNS / policy).
Fix MEDIUM headers, mail policy, and non-prod exposure.
Re-test every PoC from the public internet until closed.
Archive AWP/evidence pack for audit and retest baseline.