Agentic Testari Sentinel Hub · FriendlyAI agentictestari.com

Confidential

L3 MAX Public-max · non-destructive

Public surface assessment — Q Factory

WordPress on WP Engine. REST user enumeration still live, near-zero security headers, DMARC none. True L3: HIGH 4 · MEDIUM 3.

Target q-factory.fi Date 2026-07-29 RoE public-max · non-destructive Engagement eng_qfactory_l3_1358

HIGH

MEDIUM

INFO

—

Executive summary

Why act now

These findings are not theoretical: they are public surfaces a human or a hacker agent can consume today. Each card has proof links, impact, owner, fix, and validation — so the team takes risk seriously and acts.

Each finding includes: problem, where (clickable link), attacker/agent impact, owner, PoC (read-only), how to fix, and how to validate.

WordPress on WP Engine. REST user enumeration still live, near-zero security headers, DMARC none. True L3: HIGH 4 · MEDIUM 3.

Stack in this run

Component	Used	Note
ParviClaw Core + AWP	YES (lab)	full pack on engagement
ParviSight browser	partial	HTTP walk / agentic
PayBotFin Witness live	as engaged	honest scope in annex

Findings

Each finding includes: problem, where (clickable link), attacker/agent impact, owner, PoC (read-only), how to fix, and how to validate.

QF-H1

WordPress REST user enumeration

HIGH

The problem

GET https://q-factory.fi/wp-json/wp/v2/users → 200. Five users public including id 25 name onni-vilhelm.ojanen@q-factory.fi (personal email as WP display name); also hutcode, jenny.ammondt, petra.vaisalo, Q-Factory Oy. Re-confirmed live 2026-07-31. last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Exposes real account identifiers for phishing and password spray.

Where

https://q-factory.fi/wp-json/wp/v2/users · https://q-factory.fi

Exposed identities (live re-check)

GET https://q-factory.fi/wp-json/wp/v2/users → 200 — 5 users public, including a person e-mail used as WordPress display name:

id	slug	name (public)
26	hutcode	hutcode
28	jenny-ammondt	jenny.ammondt
25	onni-vilhelm-ojanenq-factory-fi	onni-vilhelm.ojanen@q-factory.fi
23	petra-vaisalo	petra.vaisalo
2	qfactory	Q-Factory Oy

Also open: /wp-json, /wp-json/wp/v2, posts. First pentest (2026-07-28 phase2) already recorded id 25 as email-like identity; re-confirmed live 2026-07-31.

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Harvest public WP usernames/emails for phishing and password spray.
Agent (LLM+tools): Pull /wp-json/wp/v2/users in a loop; expand spray lists.
If invasive/destructive: Account takeover → CMS compromise. L3 only proves unauthenticated enum.

Who owns it

Q Factory — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sS 'https://q-factory.fi/wp-json/wp/v2/users' | head -c 800

How to fix

Block unauthenticated /wp-json/wp/v2/users; never use email as display name; MFA on WP; harden wp-login.

How to validate the fix

Block unauthenticated /wp-json/wp/v2/users; never use email as display name; MFA on WP; harden wp-login.

QF-H2

Missing major security headers

HIGH

The problem

https://q-factory.fi/ response headers — What / evidence: No CSP/HSTS/XFO/nosniff baseline (deep + prior). Fix: Full header baseline last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Weak browser security headers increase impact of XSS/clickjacking/MITM.

Where

https://q-factory.fi/ · https://q-factory.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public headers surface on q-factory.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Q Factory — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://q-factory.fi/' | egrep -i 'strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content'

How to fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://q-factory.fi/.

How to validate the fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://q-factory.fi/.

QF-H3

DMARC p=none

HIGH

The problem

DNS TXT at _dmarc.q-factory.fi publishes a DMARC policy with p=none (monitor-only). Receiving servers do not quarantine/reject forged @q-factory.fi mail on DMARC fail. This is email brand spoofing / BEC risk, not a website bug. Proof: dig TXT _dmarc.q-factory.fi +short last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Brand email spoofing / BEC remains easier while DMARC on q-factory.fi is not reject.

Where

DNS record (not a website): _dmarc.q-factory.fi TXT
Mail domain: @q-factory.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Forge invoices / IT resets as @q-factory.fi while p=none.
Agent (LLM+tools): Re-check DMARC; automate brand-domain spoof campaigns.
If invasive/destructive: Financial fraud via trusted-looking mail — not CMS takeover from this alone. L3 only proves DNS policy (dig).

Who owns it

Q Factory — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

dig TXT _dmarc.q-factory.fi +short

How to fix

Align SPF/DKIM for all legitimate senders; move DMARC to p=quarantine then p=reject; monitor rua; document third-party senders.

How to validate the fix

Align SPF/DKIM for all legitimate senders; move DMARC to p=quarantine then p=reject; monitor rua; document third-party senders.

QF-H4

Public wp-login

HIGH

The problem

https://q-factory.fi/ — What / evidence: Login spray surface with known usernames. Fix: MFA, rate limit, WAF last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Default WP login is a permanent spray target.

Where

https://q-factory.fi/ · https://q-factory.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public wp_login surface on q-factory.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Q Factory — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://q-factory.fi/'

How to fix

MFA, rate limit, WAF, optional allowlist; combine with blocking user REST enum.

How to validate the fix

MFA, rate limit, WAF, optional allowlist; combine with blocking user REST enum.

QF-M1

Full REST index open

MEDIUM

The problem

large wp-json surface (surface: https://q-factory.fi/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on q-factory.fi expands recon until closed.

Where

https://q-factory.fi/ · https://q-factory.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on q-factory.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Q Factory — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://q-factory.fi/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on q-factory.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on q-factory.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

QF-M2

HubSpot forms third-party

MEDIUM

The problem

HubSpot forms third-party (surface: https://q-factory.fi/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on q-factory.fi expands recon until closed.

Where

https://q-factory.fi/ · https://q-factory.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on q-factory.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Q Factory — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://q-factory.fi/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on q-factory.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on q-factory.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

QF-M3

moodle/equal historical DNS

MEDIUM

The problem

not responding now — watch reappearance (surface: https://q-factory.fi/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on q-factory.fi expands recon until closed.

Where

https://q-factory.fi/ · https://q-factory.fi

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on q-factory.fi expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Q Factory — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://q-factory.fi/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on q-factory.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on q-factory.fi DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

Evidence annexes (AWP + Core)

Real pack from L3 max retest 2026-07-31 (public-max, non-destructive). Each file has a caption. Links open the artifact.

1) awp-receipt.json — AWP crypto

What it is: signed Agent Witness Protocol receipt (offline-verifiable).
What it proves: integrity of our test/engagement log.
What it is NOT: not alone proof of the bug on your host (that is each finding’s PoC).
→ download awp-receipt.json

2) leaves.jsonl — engagement diary

What it is: append-only leaves (scope, probes seal, catalog, quality, seal).
What it proves: timeline of this retest run.
→ download leaves.jsonl · leaf-chain.txt (PASS)

3) retest-raw.json — HTTP probes

What it is: status/headers/samples from public-max probes.
What it proves: what the internet saw during the run.
→ download retest-raw.json

4) agentic-walk.json — surface map

What it is: multi-page walk summary (URLs, sizes, forms).
→ download agentic-walk.json · core-export.json

5) folder

→ open full evidence folder · engagement eng_qfactory_l3_retest_1361 · witness_mode local_awp_dev (DEV_LAB keys — not production ceremony).

How to use / verify AWP (open-source)

Client steps

Download awp-receipt.json from the annex (or clone the evidence folder).
On any machine with Node 18+:

# from the evidence folder
npx agent-witness-protocol verify awp-receipt.json

# or with local package
node /path/to/agent-witness-protocol/bin/awp.js verify awp-receipt.json

Honest PASS meaning: the receipt’s signature, Merkle inclusion, and checkpoint check out — the test log is intact.
PASS does NOT mean: your production bug is fixed, or that PayBotFin live network witness was used (this pack is local_awp_dev / DEV_LAB unless noted).

PayBotFin Witness: live network emit is optional and engagement-scoped. If not listed above as network_emit, do not claim live PayBot verification for this run.

Remediation order for the team

Close HIGH public exposures first (auth / VPN / DNS / policy).
Fix MEDIUM headers, mail policy, and non-prod exposure.
Re-test every PoC from the public internet until closed.
Archive AWP/evidence pack for audit and retest baseline.