Julkisen pinnan arviointi — Digia
HubSpot/Cloudflare marketing. Identity is the story: public Citrix ADC/Gateway, Entra SAML channels, admin SPAs, plus weak DMARC. True L3: HIGH 6 · MEDIUM 5.
Johtoyhteenveto
Miksi toimia nyt
Nämä havainnot eivät ole teoreettisia: ne ovat julkisia pintoja. Jokaisessa kortissa on todiste, vaikutus, omistaja, korjaus ja validointi.
HubSpot/Cloudflare marketing. Identity is the story: public Citrix ADC/Gateway, Entra SAML channels, admin SPAs, plus weak DMARC. True L3: HIGH 6 · MEDIUM 5.
Pinossa tässä ajossa
| Komponentti | Käytössä | Huom |
|---|---|---|
| ParviClaw Core + AWP | KYLLÄ (lab) | pack engagementissa |
| ParviSight browser | osittain | HTTP walk |
| PayBotFin Witness live | sopimuksen mukaan | rehellinen laajuus |
Havainnot
Jokainen havainto: ongelma, missä, vaikutus, omistaja, PoC, korjaus, validointi.
Citrix NetScaler/ADC Gateway (login.digia.com)
KORKEAhttps://digia.com/ — What / evidence: Live 200 title “NetScaler AAA”; Citrix LogonPoint fingerprints confirmed 2026-07-29. Fix: Patch/MFA; shrink public gateway; prefer allowlists last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Internet-facing remote-access edge is a permanent high-value target.
- Human: Internet-facing remote-access edge is a permanent high-value target.
- Agent (LLM+tools): Fingerprint appliance; CVE watch; clone login UX.
- If invasive/destructive: Closer to internal network than marketing CMS. L3 only proves public exposure.
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/'
Patch appliance, enforce MFA + conditional access; prefer private/VPN allowlist; monitor CVE feeds.
Exposure remains until closed.
DMARC p=none
KORKEADNS TXT at _dmarc.digia.com publishes a DMARC policy with p=none (monitor-only). Receiving servers do not quarantine/reject forged @digia.com mail on DMARC fail. This is email brand spoofing / BEC risk, not a website bug. Proof: dig TXT _dmarc.digia.com +short last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Brand email spoofing / BEC remains easier while DMARC on digia.com is not reject.
DNS record (not a website): _dmarc.digia.com TXT
Mail domain: @digia.com
- Human: Forge invoices / IT resets as
@digia.comwhilep=none. - Agent (LLM+tools): Re-check DMARC; automate brand-domain spoof campaigns.
- If invasive/destructive: Financial fraud via trusted-looking mail — not CMS takeover from this alone. L3 only proves DNS policy (dig).
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
dig TXT _dmarc.digia.com +short
Align SPF/DKIM for all legitimate senders; move DMARC to p=quarantine then p=reject; monitor rua; document third-party senders.
Brand spoofing of @digia.com stays easy forever.
Entra SAML channel hosts
KORKEAWhat / evidence: https://channel.digia.com + channel-test.digia.com both 200 public. Fix: Remove test host; CA/VPN; review app regs last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Public auth/federation edges expand phishing and IdP attack surface.
- Human: Public auth surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
- Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
- If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
curl -sSI 'https://channel.digia.com'
Remove non-prod auth edges from public DNS; prefer auth code+PKCE; conditional access; minimize public metadata where possible.
Exposure remains until closed.
Center hosts throw Shibboleth config errors
KORKEAWhat / evidence: https://center.digia.com + centerstaging.digia.com → HTTP 500 shibsp::ConfigurationException (live). Fix: Fix or de-publicize last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Public auth/federation edges expand phishing and IdP attack surface.
- Human: Public auth surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
- Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
- If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
curl -sSI 'https://center.digia.com'
Remove non-prod auth edges from public DNS; prefer auth code+PKCE; conditional access; minimize public metadata where possible.
Exposure remains until closed.
DFAU admin/backend public SPAs
KORKEAWhat / evidence: https://admin.dfau.digia.com 200; backend.dfau.digia.com 200 “React App”. Fix: SSO + allowlist or private DNS last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Public brand surface on digia.com expands recon until closed.
- Human: Public edge surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
- Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
- If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
curl -sSI 'https://admin.dfau.digia.com'
Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.
Exposure remains until closed.
Public non-prod/staging estate
KORKEAExamples: https://centerstaging.digia.com (Apache 302), center.digia.com, historical annualreport*, digialab/dev signals in DNS. last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Public brand surface on digia.com expands recon until closed.
- Human: Public edge surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
- Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
- If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
curl -sSI 'https://centerstaging.digia.com'
Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.
Continuous recon gift; staging credential reuse risk.
Thin marketing CSP
KESKIupgrade-insecure-requests only on brochure (surface: https://digia.com/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Weak browser security headers increase impact of XSS/clickjacking/MITM.
- Human: Public headers surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
- Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
- If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/' | egrep -i 'strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content'
Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://digia.com/.
Re-run PoC from public internet until closed (digia.com).
No security.txt / CAA gaps
KESKIdisclosure + issuance policy missing (surface: https://digia.com/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Public brand surface on digia.com expands recon until closed.
- Human: Public edge surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
- Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
- If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/'
Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.
Re-run PoC from public internet until closed (digia.com).
Missing nosniff/XFO samples
KESKIheader baseline incomplete on marketing (surface: https://digia.com/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Weak browser security headers increase impact of XSS/clickjacking/MITM.
- Human: Public headers surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
- Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
- If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/' | egrep -i 'strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content'
Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://digia.com/.
Re-run PoC from public internet until closed (digia.com).
Extra edge ports / scan noise
KESKIhistorical 8080/8443-style listeners (surface: https://digia.com/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Public brand surface on digia.com expands recon until closed.
- Human: Public edge surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
- Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
- If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/'
Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.
Re-run PoC from public internet until closed (digia.com).
Third-party chat/bot IDs
KESKILeadoo/HubSpot recon surface (surface: https://digia.com/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.
Public brand surface on digia.com expands recon until closed.
- Human: Public edge surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
- Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
- If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.
Digia — turva / tuote / infra (vahvista omistaja)
Read-only. Does not change the system.
curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/'
Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.
Re-run PoC from public internet until closed (digia.com).
Liitteet (AWP + Core)
Oikea pack L3 max retestistä 2026-07-31 (public-max, ei-tuhoava). Jokaisella tiedostolla on kuvateksti.
Mikä se on: allekirjoitettu Agent Witness Protocol -kuitti (offline-tarkistettava).
Mitä se todistaa: meidän testi-/engagement-lokimme eheyden.
Mitä se EI ole: ei yksin todista bugia hostissanne (se on kunkin havainnon PoC).
→ lataa awp-receipt.json
Miten AWP:ta käytetään / varmennetaan (open-source)
npx agent-witness-protocol verify awp-receipt.json
PASS (rehellisesti): kuitin allekirjoitus ja Merkle-todiste ok — testiloki on ehjä.
PASS ei tarkoita: että tuotantobugi on korjattu, tai että PayBotFin live-witness oli käytössä (local_awp_dev / DEV_LAB).
Korjausjärjestys tiimille
- Sulje HIGH-julkiset altistukset ensin (auth / VPN / DNS).
- Korjaa MEDIUM-otsikot, postikäytäntö ja non-prod.
- Uudelleentestaa PoC:t julkisesta netistä kunnes kiinni.
- Arkistoi AWP/evidence auditointia ja retestiä varten.