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L3 MAX Public-max · non-destructive

Public surface assessment — Digia

HubSpot/Cloudflare marketing. Identity is the story: public Citrix ADC/Gateway, Entra SAML channels, admin SPAs, plus weak DMARC. True L3: HIGH 6 · MEDIUM 5.

Target digia.com Date 2026-07-29 RoE public-max · non-destructive Engagement eng_digia_l3_1358

HIGH

MEDIUM

INFO

—

Executive summary

Why act now

These findings are not theoretical: they are public surfaces a human or a hacker agent can consume today. Each card has proof links, impact, owner, fix, and validation — so the team takes risk seriously and acts.

Each finding includes: problem, where (clickable link), attacker/agent impact, owner, PoC (read-only), how to fix, and how to validate.

HubSpot/Cloudflare marketing. Identity is the story: public Citrix ADC/Gateway, Entra SAML channels, admin SPAs, plus weak DMARC. True L3: HIGH 6 · MEDIUM 5.

Stack in this run

Component	Used	Note
ParviClaw Core + AWP	YES (lab)	full pack on engagement
ParviSight browser	partial	HTTP walk / agentic
PayBotFin Witness live	as engaged	honest scope in annex

Findings

Each finding includes: problem, where (clickable link), attacker/agent impact, owner, PoC (read-only), how to fix, and how to validate.

DG-H1

Citrix NetScaler/ADC Gateway (login.digia.com)

HIGH

The problem

https://digia.com/ — What / evidence: Live 200 title “NetScaler AAA”; Citrix LogonPoint fingerprints confirmed 2026-07-29. Fix: Patch/MFA; shrink public gateway; prefer allowlists last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Internet-facing remote-access edge is a permanent high-value target.

Where

https://digia.com/ · https://login.digia.com · https://digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Internet-facing remote-access edge is a permanent high-value target.
Agent (LLM+tools): Fingerprint appliance; CVE watch; clone login UX.
If invasive/destructive: Closer to internal network than marketing CMS. L3 only proves public exposure.

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/'

How to fix

Patch appliance, enforce MFA + conditional access; prefer private/VPN allowlist; monitor CVE feeds.

How to validate the fix

Patch appliance, enforce MFA + conditional access; prefer private/VPN allowlist; monitor CVE feeds.

DG-H2

DMARC p=none

HIGH

The problem

DNS TXT at _dmarc.digia.com publishes a DMARC policy with p=none (monitor-only). Receiving servers do not quarantine/reject forged @digia.com mail on DMARC fail. This is email brand spoofing / BEC risk, not a website bug. Proof: dig TXT _dmarc.digia.com +short last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Brand email spoofing / BEC remains easier while DMARC on digia.com is not reject.

Where

DNS record (not a website): _dmarc.digia.com TXT
Mail domain: @digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Forge invoices / IT resets as @digia.com while p=none.
Agent (LLM+tools): Re-check DMARC; automate brand-domain spoof campaigns.
If invasive/destructive: Financial fraud via trusted-looking mail — not CMS takeover from this alone. L3 only proves DNS policy (dig).

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

dig TXT _dmarc.digia.com +short

How to fix

Align SPF/DKIM for all legitimate senders; move DMARC to p=quarantine then p=reject; monitor rua; document third-party senders.

How to validate the fix

Align SPF/DKIM for all legitimate senders; move DMARC to p=quarantine then p=reject; monitor rua; document third-party senders.

DG-H3

Entra SAML channel hosts

HIGH

The problem

What / evidence: https://channel.digia.com + channel-test.digia.com both 200 public. Fix: Remove test host; CA/VPN; review app regs last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public auth/federation edges expand phishing and IdP attack surface.

Where

https://channel.digia.com · https://channel-test.digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public auth surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://channel.digia.com'

How to fix

Remove non-prod auth edges from public DNS; prefer auth code+PKCE; conditional access; minimize public metadata where possible.

How to validate the fix

Remove non-prod auth edges from public DNS; prefer auth code+PKCE; conditional access; minimize public metadata where possible.

DG-H4

Center hosts throw Shibboleth config errors

HIGH

The problem

What / evidence: https://center.digia.com + centerstaging.digia.com → HTTP 500 shibsp::ConfigurationException (live). Fix: Fix or de-publicize last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public auth/federation edges expand phishing and IdP attack surface.

Where

https://center.digia.com · https://centerstaging.digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public auth surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://center.digia.com'

How to fix

Remove non-prod auth edges from public DNS; prefer auth code+PKCE; conditional access; minimize public metadata where possible.

How to validate the fix

Remove non-prod auth edges from public DNS; prefer auth code+PKCE; conditional access; minimize public metadata where possible.

DG-H5

DFAU admin/backend public SPAs

HIGH

The problem

What / evidence: https://admin.dfau.digia.com 200; backend.dfau.digia.com 200 “React App”. Fix: SSO + allowlist or private DNS last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on digia.com expands recon until closed.

Where

https://admin.dfau.digia.com · https://backend.dfau.digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://admin.dfau.digia.com'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

DG-H6

Public non-prod/staging estate

HIGH

The problem

Examples: https://centerstaging.digia.com (Apache 302), center.digia.com, historical annualreport*, digialab/dev signals in DNS. last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on digia.com expands recon until closed.

Where

https://centerstaging.digia.com · https://center.digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://centerstaging.digia.com'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

DG-M1

Thin marketing CSP

MEDIUM

The problem

upgrade-insecure-requests only on brochure (surface: https://digia.com/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Weak browser security headers increase impact of XSS/clickjacking/MITM.

Where

https://digia.com/ · https://digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public headers surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/' | egrep -i 'strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content'

How to fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://digia.com/.

How to validate the fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://digia.com/.

DG-M2

No security.txt / CAA gaps

MEDIUM

The problem

disclosure + issuance policy missing (surface: https://digia.com/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on digia.com expands recon until closed.

Where

https://digia.com/ · https://digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

DG-M3

Missing nosniff/XFO samples

MEDIUM

The problem

header baseline incomplete on marketing (surface: https://digia.com/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Weak browser security headers increase impact of XSS/clickjacking/MITM.

Where

https://digia.com/ · https://digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public headers surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/' | egrep -i 'strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content'

How to fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://digia.com/.

How to validate the fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://digia.com/.

DG-M4

Extra edge ports / scan noise

MEDIUM

The problem

historical 8080/8443-style listeners (surface: https://digia.com/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on digia.com expands recon until closed.

Where

https://digia.com/ · https://digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

DG-M5

Third-party chat/bot IDs

MEDIUM

The problem

Leadoo/HubSpot recon surface (surface: https://digia.com/). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on digia.com expands recon until closed.

Where

https://digia.com/ · https://digia.com

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on digia.com expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Digia Plc — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://digia.com/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on digia.com DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

Evidence annexes (AWP + Core)

Real pack from L3 max retest 2026-07-31 (public-max, non-destructive). Each file has a caption. Links open the artifact.

1) awp-receipt.json — AWP crypto

What it is: signed Agent Witness Protocol receipt (offline-verifiable).
What it proves: integrity of our test/engagement log.
What it is NOT: not alone proof of the bug on your host (that is each finding’s PoC).
→ download awp-receipt.json

2) leaves.jsonl — engagement diary

What it is: append-only leaves (scope, probes seal, catalog, quality, seal).
What it proves: timeline of this retest run.
→ download leaves.jsonl · leaf-chain.txt (PASS)

3) retest-raw.json — HTTP probes

What it is: status/headers/samples from public-max probes.
What it proves: what the internet saw during the run.
→ download retest-raw.json

4) agentic-walk.json — surface map

What it is: multi-page walk summary (URLs, sizes, forms).
→ download agentic-walk.json · core-export.json

5) folder

→ open full evidence folder · engagement eng_digia_l3_retest_1361 · witness_mode local_awp_dev (DEV_LAB keys — not production ceremony).

How to use / verify AWP (open-source)

Client steps

Download awp-receipt.json from the annex (or clone the evidence folder).
On any machine with Node 18+:

# from the evidence folder
npx agent-witness-protocol verify awp-receipt.json

# or with local package
node /path/to/agent-witness-protocol/bin/awp.js verify awp-receipt.json

Honest PASS meaning: the receipt’s signature, Merkle inclusion, and checkpoint check out — the test log is intact.
PASS does NOT mean: your production bug is fixed, or that PayBotFin live network witness was used (this pack is local_awp_dev / DEV_LAB unless noted).

PayBotFin Witness: live network emit is optional and engagement-scoped. If not listed above as network_emit, do not claim live PayBot verification for this run.

Remediation order for the team

Close HIGH public exposures first (auth / VPN / DNS / policy).
Fix MEDIUM headers, mail policy, and non-prod exposure.
Re-test every PoC from the public internet until closed.
Archive AWP/evidence pack for audit and retest baseline.