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Confidential

L3 MAX Public-max · non-destructive

Public surface assessment — Academia Lendária

The marketing site (hosted on Vercel, Next.js stack) is well maintained: strong email authentication (DMARC reject, hard-fail SPF, Google DKIM), HSTS, real security.txt, and no secrets in public JavaScript. The real r…

Target academialendaria.ai Date 2026-07-29 RoE public-max · non-destructive Engagement eng_academialendaria_l3_1358

HIGH

MEDIUM

INFO

—

Executive summary

Why act now

These findings are not theoretical: they are public surfaces a human or a hacker agent can consume today. Each card has proof links, impact, owner, fix, and validation — so the team takes risk seriously and acts.

Each finding includes: problem, where (clickable link), attacker/agent impact, owner, PoC (read-only), how to fix, and how to validate.

The marketing site (hosted on Vercel, Next.js stack) is well maintained: strong email authentication (DMARC reject, hard-fail SPF, Google DKIM), HSTS, real security.txt, and no secrets in public JavaScript. The real risk is brand DNS exposing operational and product systems — especially Grafana with unauthenticated metrics, SSH open on the portal host, and a publicly advertised impersonation auth provider.

Stack in this run

Component	Used	Note
ParviClaw Core + AWP	YES (lab)	full pack on engagement
ParviSight browser	partial	HTTP walk / agentic
PayBotFin Witness live	as engaged	honest scope in annex

Findings

Each finding includes: problem, where (clickable link), attacker/agent impact, owner, PoC (read-only), how to fix, and how to validate.

AL-H1

Grafana with public metrics (no authentication)

HIGH

The problem

https://academialendaria.ai/ — 200, ~480 KB; version in /api/health last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public engineering/tooling yields free recon (versions, configs, APIs).

Where

https://academialendaria.ai/ · https://academialendaria.ai

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public eng surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Probe APIs/health in loops; correlate versions with CVEs.
If invasive/destructive: Source/secrets/CI risk if auth weak later. L3 only proves public exposure.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://academialendaria.ai/'

How to fix

Remove from public DNS or require VPN/SSO; disable anonymous APIs; re-test from the public internet on academialendaria.ai.

How to validate the fix

Remove from public DNS or require VPN/SSO; disable anonymous APIs; re-test from the public internet on academialendaria.ai.

AL-H2

SSH port 22 open on portal server

HIGH

The problem

https://academialendaria.ai/ (host IP) + TCP/22 — OpenSSH 9.6 banner on 207.180.223.38 last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

SSH on public web IP is a permanent brute-force target.

Where

academialendaria.ai · TCP/22

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: SSH on public IP is a permanent brute-force target.
Agent (LLM+tools): Port-scan brand IPs; spray against TCP/22.
If invasive/destructive: Shell on host. L3 only proves port open.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

nc -zv -w 3 academialendaria.ai 22

How to fix

Close TCP/22 on public edge or restrict by allowlist/bastion; keys-only; fail2ban; no password auth.

How to validate the fix

Close TCP/22 on public edge or restrict by allowlist/bastion; keys-only; fail2ban; no password auth.

AL-H3

Impersonation provider advertised in Auth.js

HIGH

The problem

https://academialendaria.ai/ — /api/auth/providers JSON last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public auth/federation edges expand phishing and IdP attack surface.

Where

https://academialendaria.ai/ · https://academialendaria.ai

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public auth surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://academialendaria.ai/'

How to fix

Remove non-prod auth edges from public DNS; prefer auth code+PKCE; conditional access; minimize public metadata where possible.

How to validate the fix

Remove non-prod auth edges from public DNS; prefer auth code+PKCE; conditional access; minimize public metadata where possible.

AL-H4

Grafana UI on brand DNS

HIGH

The problem

https://academialendaria.ai/ — ** Anyone on the internet can read Prometheus-style metrics and Grafana health/version without login. last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public engineering/tooling yields free recon (versions, configs, APIs).

Where

https://academialendaria.ai/ · https://academialendaria.ai

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public eng surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Probe APIs/health in loops; correlate versions with CVEs.
If invasive/destructive: Source/secrets/CI risk if auth weak later. L3 only proves public exposure.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://academialendaria.ai/'

How to fix

Remove from public DNS or require VPN/SSO; disable anonymous APIs; re-test from the public internet on academialendaria.ai.

How to validate the fix

Remove from public DNS or require VPN/SSO; disable anonymous APIs; re-test from the public internet on academialendaria.ai.

AL-M1

CSP report-only with unsafe scripts

MEDIUM

The problem

Evidence: CSP-Report-Only (or equivalent) still permissive for GTM/Facebook style stacks. Safe PoC: curl -sSI https://www.academialendaria.ai/ | grep -i content-security Fix: Move to enforcing CSP; reduce unsafe-inline/eval over time. --- last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Weak browser security headers increase impact of XSS/clickjacking/MITM.

Where

https://www.academialendaria.ai/ · https://www.academialendaria.ai

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public headers surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://www.academialendaria.ai/' | egrep -i 'strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content'

How to fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://academialendaria.ai/.

How to validate the fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://academialendaria.ai/.

AL-M2

CORS open to any origin (*)

MEDIUM

The problem

All www responses advertise <code>Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *</code>. Lower risk on static pages, noisy and dangerous if authenticated APIs share the origin. last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Over-permissive CORS can enable cross-origin data theft.

Where

https://academialendaria.ai/

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public cors surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://academialendaria.ai/'

How to fix

Reflect only trusted Origins; avoid Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on credentialed APIs.

How to validate the fix

Reflect only trusted Origins; avoid Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on credentialed APIs.

AL-M3

TLS cert shared with igorrover.com.br

MEDIUM

The problem

Weak browser security headers increase impact of XSS/clickjacking/MITM.

Where

https://www.academialendaria.ai/ · https://igorrover.com.br · https://www.academialendaria.ai

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public headers surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://www.academialendaria.ai/' | egrep -i 'strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content'

How to fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://academialendaria.ai/.

How to validate the fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://academialendaria.ai/.

AL-M4

Public portal health endpoint

MEDIUM

The problem

<code>/api/health</code> returns anonymous JSON with schema status — useful for recon. last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public metrics leak ops data useful for targeting.

Where

https://academialendaria.ai/

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public metrics surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://academialendaria.ai/'

How to fix

Require auth on metrics/Grafana/Prometheus or put behind VPN; never expose raw metrics publicly.

How to validate the fix

Require auth on metrics/Grafana/Prometheus or put behind VPN; never expose raw metrics publicly.

AL-M5

Public Prometheus hostname (basic auth)

MEDIUM

The problem

<code>prometheus.academialendaria.ai</code> asks for user/password (better than Grafana) but remains brand-DNS attack surface. last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public engineering/tooling yields free recon (versions, configs, APIs).

Where

https://prometheus.academialendaria.ai

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public eng surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Probe APIs/health in loops; correlate versions with CVEs.
If invasive/destructive: Source/secrets/CI risk if auth weak later. L3 only proves public exposure.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://prometheus.academialendaria.ai'

How to fix

Remove from public DNS or require VPN/SSO; disable anonymous APIs; re-test from the public internet on academialendaria.ai.

How to validate the fix

Remove from public DNS or require VPN/SSO; disable anonymous APIs; re-test from the public internet on academialendaria.ai.

AL-M6

Messy / malformed CAA records

MEDIUM

The problem

Multiple certificate issuers and malformed values (e.g. duplicated “issuewild” text). last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public brand surface on academialendaria.ai expands recon until closed.

Where

https://academialendaria.ai/

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public edge surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://academialendaria.ai/'

How to fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on academialendaria.ai DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

How to validate the fix

Remove unnecessary public hosts on academialendaria.ai DNS or enforce strong auth/WAF; re-test from internet.

AL-M7

Unknown paths return HTTP 502

MEDIUM

The problem

What: Auth.js exposes credentials provider id impersonation on public API. Where: https://portal.academialendaria.ai/api/auth/providers → 200 Body includes: "impersonation":{"id":"impersonation","name":"Credentials","type":"credentials",...} Safe PoC: ``bash curl -sS https://portal.academialendaria.ai/api/auth/providers | jq . `` Expected if fixed: Provider list wi last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public auth/federation edges expand phishing and IdP attack surface.

Where

https://portal.academialendaria.ai/api/auth/providers · https://portal.academialendaria.ai

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public auth surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://portal.academialendaria.ai/api/auth/providers'

How to fix

Remove non-prod auth edges from public DNS; prefer auth code+PKCE; conditional access; minimize public metadata where possible.

How to validate the fix

Remove non-prod auth edges from public DNS; prefer auth code+PKCE; conditional access; minimize public metadata where possible.

AL-M8

Apex HSTS weaker than www

MEDIUM

The problem

Safe PoC: ``bash curl -sS -D- -o /dev/null -H "Origin: https://evil.example" https://www.academialendaria.ai/ | grep -i access-control ` Observed access-control-allow-origin: '' Impact: Cross-origin read of responses that set ACAO ; usually lower on static marketing, higher if APIs inherit. Fix: Restrict ACAO to known origins; never *` with credentials. --- last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Weak browser security headers increase impact of XSS/clickjacking/MITM.

Where

https://evil.example · https://www.academialendaria.ai/ · https://www.academialendaria.ai

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public headers surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://evil.example' | egrep -i 'strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content'

How to fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://academialendaria.ai/.

How to validate the fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://academialendaria.ai/.

AL-M9

Brand DNS pointing to n8n

MEDIUM

The problem

<code>n8n.academialendaria.ai</code> resolves; HTTPS timed out this run (possible firewall). Still public inventory. last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Public engineering/tooling yields free recon (versions, configs, APIs).

Where

https://n8n.academialendaria.ai

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public eng surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Probe APIs/health in loops; correlate versions with CVEs.
If invasive/destructive: Source/secrets/CI risk if auth weak later. L3 only proves public exposure.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://n8n.academialendaria.ai'

How to fix

Remove from public DNS or require VPN/SSO; disable anonymous APIs; re-test from the public internet on academialendaria.ai.

How to validate the fix

Remove from public DNS or require VPN/SSO; disable anonymous APIs; re-test from the public internet on academialendaria.ai.

AL-M10

Supabase allowed in CSP connect-src

MEDIUM

The problem

Browser may talk to <code>*.supabase.co</code>. Ensure only intended anon key and RLS — no service key in client. last_reprobe=2026-07-31.

Weak browser security headers increase impact of XSS/clickjacking/MITM.

Where

https://academialendaria.ai/

What an attacker or hacker agent can do

Human: Public headers surface on academialendaria.ai expands attacker recon.
Agent (LLM+tools): Keep surface in continuous recon.
If invasive/destructive: Escalate if second bug/credential. L3 public-max is read-only.

Who owns it

Academia Lendária — security / product / infrastructure (confirm internal owner)

PoC (proof — does not fix)

Read-only. Does not change the system.

curl -sSI 'https://academialendaria.ai/' | egrep -i 'strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content'

How to fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://academialendaria.ai/.

How to validate the fix

Add/tighten HSTS, CSP, XFO, nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy on https://academialendaria.ai/.

Evidence annexes (AWP + Core)

Real pack from L3 max retest 2026-07-31 (public-max, non-destructive). Each file has a caption. Links open the artifact.

1) awp-receipt.json — AWP crypto

What it is: signed Agent Witness Protocol receipt (offline-verifiable).
What it proves: integrity of our test/engagement log.
What it is NOT: not alone proof of the bug on your host (that is each finding’s PoC).
→ download awp-receipt.json

2) leaves.jsonl — engagement diary

What it is: append-only leaves (scope, probes seal, catalog, quality, seal).
What it proves: timeline of this retest run.
→ download leaves.jsonl · leaf-chain.txt (PASS)

3) retest-raw.json — HTTP probes

What it is: status/headers/samples from public-max probes.
What it proves: what the internet saw during the run.
→ download retest-raw.json

4) agentic-walk.json — surface map

What it is: multi-page walk summary (URLs, sizes, forms).
→ download agentic-walk.json · core-export.json

5) folder

→ open full evidence folder · engagement eng_academialendaria_l3_retest_1361 · witness_mode local_awp_dev (DEV_LAB keys — not production ceremony).

How to use / verify AWP (open-source)

Client steps

Download awp-receipt.json from the annex (or clone the evidence folder).
On any machine with Node 18+:

# from the evidence folder
npx agent-witness-protocol verify awp-receipt.json

# or with local package
node /path/to/agent-witness-protocol/bin/awp.js verify awp-receipt.json

Honest PASS meaning: the receipt’s signature, Merkle inclusion, and checkpoint check out — the test log is intact.
PASS does NOT mean: your production bug is fixed, or that PayBotFin live network witness was used (this pack is local_awp_dev / DEV_LAB unless noted).

PayBotFin Witness: live network emit is optional and engagement-scoped. If not listed above as network_emit, do not claim live PayBot verification for this run.

Remediation order for the team

Close HIGH public exposures first (auth / VPN / DNS / policy).
Fix MEDIUM headers, mail policy, and non-prod exposure.
Re-test every PoC from the public internet until closed.
Archive AWP/evidence pack for audit and retest baseline.